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Last week, in a long anticipated decision, the United States Supreme Court decided by 5-4
that foreign corporations cannot be sued in US federal court for human rights violations that
occurred outside the US. The Court, divided along ideological lines, excluded the possibility
of using the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), an arcane 18  century statute, as a means of
bringing such foreign corporate actors to justice in the US; the ATCA confers first instance
jurisdiction on US federal courts for torts that violate the law of nations.
The facts of Jesner are horrible to contemplate – the question before the Court involved a
suit by Israeli victims for terrorist attacks that occurred in Israel and the Palestinian
territories in 2000.  Without redress or attempt at reconciliation, all that was left to the
victims’ families was the path of the law – a path that perhaps oddly ran from the Middle
East to the US District Court. Since the country’s founding in the 18  century, a little-known
statute called the “Alien Tort Act” associated with the First Congress allowed aliens to file in
US federal courts where violations “of the law of nations” were at stake.  Here, Israeli
victims sued those who they claimed had financed the terror of Hamas and other terrorist
organizations, i.e., the Arab Bank.
The revival of the ATCA in the 1980s as a tool in confronting human rights abuses resulted
in successful suits or settlements against foreign torturers and genocidaires – Filartiga
 involving Paraguayan torturers; Balkans henchman Radovan Karadzic, the Marcos case
for Philippine human rights abuses, to name just a few. These decisions created high
expectations among human rights activists and international lawyers.
Yet, decades on, as the membership of the United States Supreme Court changed, the
Court seemed to question more and more what the basis was for hearing foreign human
rights violations in US federal courts; and moved towards limiting such human rights suits. 
Recently, certain appeals courts decisions and the Supreme Court have narrowed the
scope of the ATCA, including the Supreme Court’s Kiobel judgment where the majority held
that there must be a substantial nexus with the United States for jurisdiction to be properly
exercised under the ATCA.  In Kiobel, the Court had left the issue of corporate tort liability
open. Now, in Jesner, that issue is closed.
The plurality opinion offered a cramped revisionist history of the evolution of corporate
liability, a concept which may have few analogs in the 18  century founding period from
which the ATCA originated. This, according to Justice Kennedy, was reason to leave the
issue of deciding on corporate liability to the legislative branch. Was this a matter of judicial
caution, as Kennedy claimed, or rather of creative interpretation?
Justice Sotomayor for the four dissenters saw things differently.  For the dissent, the issue
was normative – a matter of federal common law, and well within the Court’s power to
decide: “Nothing about the corporate form in itself justifies categorically foreclosing
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corporate liability.”  The question at stake depended on whether the relevant norm under
international law bound only state actors or also private actors. Justice Sotomayor saw no
international law norm accepted by civilized nations distinguishing between natural and
juridical actors at issue in the case. Sotomayor, rightly in my view, observed that the issue
of corporate tort liability was a matter for federal common law, a domain of the Court, and
did not depend on the law of nations; it was enough that the law of nations did not per se or
generally exclude the responsibility of juridical persons such as corporations.
And nor does it. Indeed, contra Kennedy’s odd recapitulation of history, even in the last
century in many jurisdictions, corporations – as such – have been held responsible even
criminally in the same fashion for human rights wrong-doings.  Since post-WWII period
Nuremberg, corporations were considered responsible for international crimes, and
defendants of companies like IG Farben were acting both individually and collectively. 
Three corporate entities were held criminally responsible for atrocities – organizations
including the SS and Gestapo, because of their corporate criminal purpose – and their
members would ergo be responsible under criminal conspiracy law under “Bernay’s
brainchild.”  Later on, in the post-Cold War transitions throughout Latin America – e.g., in
Argentina – there had been an upsurge in suits for corporate complicity in kidnapping and
torture; e.g., against corporations like Ford which helped support the torture centers.  In
South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission processes (TRC) considered
business’s significant role in apartheid.  Relatedly, in the Khulumani litigation, there are
instances of corporations being held to account for grave human rights abuses.  In the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, heads of factories were prosecuted criminally
for genocide.  As we can see, this sort of litigation already exists as a global matter.
Beyond the confusion about whether there was any relevant international law somehow
cutting off jurisdiction in this case involving a foreign bank, there was the added judicial
caution about taking such cases at all.  Which brings us to the question of the issue of
whether when it comes to “humanity law” – cases involving serious human rights violations
affecting persons and peoples – whether foreign courts should keep their doors open. 
Here, the real issue seemed to be the foreignness of the corporations – not their juridical
form – which is just another way of re-raising the question of whether this case offers
enough of a nexus to the US, a question already decided in Kiobel. While the Arab Bank
had a branch in the US, the majority does not find this to be enough.  In his opinion for the
plurality, Kennedy went on to make far broader statements implying that the very act of
allowing a basis for human rights litigation would somehow be deleterious to the other
countries, – i..e., that the U.S. should not meddle in affairs of other countries relying on a
brief of the Administration.
Yet, advancing such a diplomatic immunity for corporations writ large seems outrageous.
 To what extent does the Executive have the power to elide its universal obligations to
protection of human rights?  Indeed, in the case of Jordan and the Arab Bank, we are
talking about whether there is going to be any redress transnationally of the terror financed
by a bank of a non-democracy.  The U.S. Supreme Court in what seemed slavish
obsequiousness to the Administration claimed that giving plaintiffs a remedy would not
“promote harmony in international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for
international law violations in circumstances where the absence of such a remedy might
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provoke foreign nations to hold the US responsible.”  Au contraire, for the majority “the
opposite is occurring.”  Perhaps, because the case involved terrorism, there was more
deference here to the Executive branch than might otherwise be the case.  But then we
hope this is dicta, as it would go to core rule of law for human rights claims to be simply
suspendable by the Executive Branch without any further reasons.
After all, in many instances what we see is that foreign litigation has drawn needed
attention to human rights violations that have eluded diplomatic or other political attention. 
It’s counterfactual to say the matter is better just left to the country when that country has
been at best indifferent – and especially so when one is talking about non-democracies with
limited judicial access.  Indeed, what we see instead is that transnational litigation rarely
displaces the actions of local actors, but rather that there has been more of a dialogue here
– often such litigation has been critical in promoting human rights abroad.  Consider that it
was only after US judicial involvement in the Khulumani cases granting redress for their
suffering and confiscation under apartheid – brought under the ATCA – that South Africa
reconsidered these plaintiffs’ claims and went on to hold the corporations liable.  Similarly,
Chile’s strong man and human rights abuser General Pinochet was brought to account in
his home country as a result of the doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
consolidating rights for victims to repair. This happened only after Spain’s extradition
attempt whereupon a series of events was put into play.
Of course, the US can exercise prudence particularly in the area of counter terror where
there may well be other approaches available such as the Anti-Terrorism Act; and further
insist that for litigation under the Alien Tort Act there has to be some connection to the
United States. Where such a nexus exists, the Court has still left the door open for suits
against individual human rights abusers; it ought not be understood as giving states and/or
private actors carte blanche to engage in human rights violations outside of US borders.
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